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I INTRODUCTION 
The law of social welfare has been developed from the notion that welfare is 
a "gratuity" furnished by the state, and thus may be made subject to 
whatever conditions the state seems fit to impose. 1 Accordingly, recipients 
have been subjected to a variety of forms of procedure and control not 
imposed on other citizens, almost as to prove that "the poor are all too easily 
regulated".2 The New Zealand Social Security Act 1964 (SSA) deviates from 
the general welfare idea by providing the claimants and recipients with a 
complex review and appeals system, arguably to protect the claimants 
against wrongful decisions of the Department, thereby ensuring procedural 
fairness and the correct distribution of the benefit payments. However, the 
very idea of the SSA is not mentioned in the Act, instead it was - and still is 
- up to the courts to establish its purpose. The court in Chief Executive 
Department of Work and Income v Vicary, put one, possible, interpretation 
as follows:3 
[The purpose of the Act is] to aid those who truly are in need of financial 
assistance in a way that is administratively efficient and not wasteful of public 
funds. Those considerations have to be balanced. 
Considering that the people affected by Departmental decisions have little or 
no education at all and are afraid of any bureaucracy, it is questionable if 
such interpretations put forward by the courts do provide for sufficient 
protection of the applicants. As most applicants in a conflict about benefits 
won't even reach the stage of a judicial review, either due to lack of financial 
means or due to unawareness of their 1ights in general, it is obvious, that the 
strongest influence arises from the daily application of the Act, and, in this 
respect, from the efficiency of the provided administrative review process. 
After explaining the general principles of administrative and judicial justice 
in New Zealand and Germany, this paper compares the review and appeals 
process of the SSA with the German social and administrative law system 
1 Charles A. Reich Individual Rights and social welfare: The emerging legal issues, 255, 255, in Peter 
Robson Welfare Law (Dartmouth, Hants, 1992). 
2 Above Reich, 255. 
3 Chief Executive Department of Work and Income v Vicary [2001] NZAR 628, 634 (HC) per Gendall J. 
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and has a closer look on two influential New Zealand court decisions. These 
decisions are first analysed and the differences between the SSA and the 
German Social Law are highlighted and explained. In a second step, the 
paper shows how a German court would approach the New Zealand cases 
and explains why and to which degree the outcome would be different. The 
final outlook summarises the findings and gives proposals on how the SSA, 
and its application by the Department and the courts in general could be 
changed. 
II GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
Today administrative law is admittedly as much an academic discipline and 
a practical reality in the common law world as in the continental. There are 
differences in the two systems due to the origin and growth of administrative 
law and its instrumentalities and manifestations in many details. But the 
central theme that runs through administrative law is the same everywhere4 
and that is the legal control of governmental powers: 5 
The primary purpose of administrative law [ ... ] is to keep the powers of the 
government within their legal bounds, so as to protect the citizen against their 
abuse. 
In other words, administrative law aims at fairness in governmental dealings 
and a good administration should correspond with the community's sense of 
justice.6 The underlying principles in the common and civil law, however, 
are quite different and, as it is shown later, may lead to different results 
although considering the same cases. 
A Administrative Justice In Common Law 
It is widely acknowledged that when things go wrong in Government, certain 
4 Mahendra P.Singh German Administrative Law in Common law Perspective (Springer-Yerlag, 
Heidelberg, 1985) l. 
5 Quite often this power is also accompanied with duty:" It is also the concern of administrative law to see 
that the public authorities can be compelled to perform their duties if they make default." William Wade 
Administrative law (6 th ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988) 5. 
6 Above Wade, Administrative Law, 7. 
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instruments must be at hand to provide for an independent examination to 
discover what happened and to ensure that those responsible may be called to 
account.7 Although there are stark differences between the way in which civil 
servants and ministers make decisions, public law tends to apply and is 
influenced by principles derived from the courts to administrative decisions,8 
which is especially mirrored in the procedure provided by the relevant 
legislation to deal with arising disputes.9 Every administrative procedure has 
to comply with the notion of natural justice, which is quite often equated with 
fairness. 10 In administrative law, natural justice refers to two fundamental 
rules of fair procedure: that a man may not be Judge in his own cause, and 
that a man' s defence must always be fairly heard. 11 These rules are so 
universal that they cannot be confined to judicial power only, instead apply 
equally to administrative power, 12 to the extent that "a decision which offends 
against the principles of natural justice is outside the jurisdiction of the 
decision-making authority." 13 But when does a decision offend these 
principles? It is clear, that it is not possible to establish standardized rules 
applicable for every thinkable case. The concept of fairness therefore needs 
an element of flexibility 14 to be practicable: 15 
[ ... ] what the requirements of fairness demand when any body, domestic, 
administrative or judicial, has to make a decision which will affect the rights of 
individuals depends on the character of the decision- making body, the kind of 
decision it has to make and the statutory or other framework in which it operates. 
7 E.C.S. Wade and A.W. Bradley Constitutional and Administrativellaw (11 ed, Longman, London, 
1993) 641. . 
8 Through the doctrines of natural justice and procedural fairness: see Carol Harlow and Richard 
Rawlings Law and Administratioll (Butterworths, London, 1997) 495 . 
9 Above Wade/Bradley, 642. 
10 Grahame Aldous and John Alder Applications for Judicial Review Law and Practice (Butterworths, 
London, 1985) 8: "In truth the so called rules are little more than a duty to act fairly." 
11 Above Aldous/ Alder, 9; Diane Longley and Rhoda James Administrative Justice: Central Issues ill UK 
and European Administrative Law (Cavendish, London ,1999) 215. 
12 Above Wade/Bradley, 466; this is explicitly expressed by the court in Ankers v The Attorney General 
[ 1995] NZAR 241 (HC) per Thorpe J 241, 268: "In my view, the case for the contention of breach of the 
rules of natural justice can be put more simply. Administrative fairness in the case of an applicant for a 
benefit such as a special benefit must, in my view, include an opportunity to place before the decision 
maker information relevant to his decision." 
13 Above Wade/Bradley, 467 . In Attorney - General v Ryan [ 1980) AC 718, 727 (PC) the court expressed 
that for [a person having legal authority] "it is a necessary implication that he is required to observe the 
principles of natural justice when exercising that authority; and, if he fails to do so, his purported decision 
is a nullity." 
14 Above Harlow/Rawlings, 503. 
5 
To ensure administrative fairness the SSA provides three steps of review 
(Administrative Review - transfer to a District Review Committee (DRC) -
transfer to Social Security Appeal Authority (SSAA)), before the appeal to 
the ffigh Court and Court of Appeal is applicable. 16 The reliance to control 
administrative decisions by way of review through two tribunals (the DRC 
and SSAA) follows the trend of social legislation in the 20th century, which, 
as the administration of welfare schemes involves large numbers of small 
claims, demanded tribunals for the reasons of speedier, cheaper and more 
accessible justice. 17 Although the SSA provides the procedural frame, 18 it is 
later shown that the ideas of fairness have not been adopted throughout the 
administration. 
B Administrative Justice In Germany 
In contrast to the common law system, where the primary concern of 
administrative law has been only fairness in administrative dealings, due to a 
closer relationship between the administration and the courts, a better 
combination of fairness with good and efficient administration has been 
established. 19 However, the most distinctive feature of the German 
administrative law for a common law lawyer is the existence of a separate 
system of courts to settle administrative disputes.20 As a "Rechtsstaat" 
Germany is a state based on the rule of law,21 which demands that all state 
activities are based on laws warranted under the constitution. In case of 
unlawful exercise of power by the state, the individual has legal remedy in 
15 Lloyd and others v McMahon [1987] AC 625, 702 (HL(E)). 
16 See further under III B. 
17 Above Wade, 897. 
18 This paper does not get into a deeper analysis, as to which extend this structure is indeed useful and 
appropriate. As the English Social Security Administration Act 1992 follows a quite similar structure 
(compare above Wade/Bradley, 648.649.), it seems that that New Zealand followed the concept of a 
tribunal based social security legislation already in existing in England. However, the question arises why 
the legislature did not follow an easier review process (for example as it was later established with the 
ACC legislation). There, the review process allows for an appeal to the courts as soon as the claimant 
received the review decision (for a detailed description of the Review and Appeal Process see New 
Zealand Council of Trade Unions ACC Review and Appeals (Wellington, March 1997) 13. 
19 Above Singh, l. 
20 Above Singh, 3. 
21 As expressed in Article land 19(2) of the German Basic Law (Appendix II). 
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an independent court.22 Furthermore, as the German Basic Law declares the 
Federal Republic of Germany a Social State,23 it is the official duty of the 
part of the administration assigned to look after the welfare of the socially 
weak to help them in achieving the legally granted rights and benefits.24 
Therefore, the administration has to take the Social State Clause m every 
decision and every exercise of discretion into account. 25 
C Judicial Review In New Zealand 
The rule of law together with the doctrine of ultra v1res (both uncodified 
law)26 form the basis for judicial review of administrative powers in 
common law. If no further regulations are codified in the constitution (as it is 
the case in New Zealand), the challenge of an administrative action can only 
be based on the grounds that the administrative action is based on no Jaw or 
is ultra vires. 27 This is reflected in the definition of judicial review as: 28 
[ ... ] the product of the common law reflecting not the direct will of Parliament 
on who should do what, but the separate assessment by the courts of what is 
needed for the good of society to (variously expressed) "control", "supervise", 
"keep within Parliaments instructions" the activities of government related 
authorities. In doing this, the courts are impliedly claiming to implement a "will" 
of the public. 
The purpose of judicial review is two-fold and comprises the definition of 
principles of Government administration and the safeguarding of individual 
interests against illegal or unreasonable administrative action. 29 It is 
important to keep in mind that judicial review is not the same as an appeal: it 
22 Above Singh, 5 and 6: The right to approach the courts in case of infringement of any right by any 
f:ublic authority is one of the basic rights enumerated in the Basic Law. 
3 Art. l of the German Basic Law (Appendix II). Above Singh, 7, 8: Although the concept of the social 
state is not defined either in the Basic Law or any other Jaw, there is a general understanding about its 
main characteristics: creation of tolerable conditions of life, social security, social freedom and the 
£rovision for compensation for injuries to individuals caused through state action. 
4 This was emphasized by the Federal Court of Justice in an early deci sion : (1957) NJW 1873, 1874 
(BGH). 
25 Above Singh, 8. 
26 Above Singh, 65 . 
27 Above Singh, 65. 
28 GD S Taylor Judicial Review A New Zealand Perspective (Butterworths, Wellington, 1991) 3. In Chief 
Constable of the North Wales Police v Evans ([ 1982) l WLR l 155, 1173), the court gave the definition 
that ·~udicial review is concerned, not with the decision, but with the decision making process." 
29 Above Scholtens, 2. 
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is concerned with the process by which the decision is made, not the merits 
of the ultimate decision. 30 In New Zealand, the courts have historically had 
jurisdiction to review the decisions of public bodies under an ancient form of 
common Jaw remedy known as 'prerogative writs'. Over time the procedural 
rules became very complex and in 1972 Parliament enacted the Judicature 
Amendment Act 1972 to simplify the procedures for reviewing the powers, 
which derived from statutes. The exercise of non - statutory public powers, 
however, still remains reviewable at common law. 31 But the power of the 
courts can be restricted by legislation. This takes usually place through the 
creation of administrative tribunals, which can decide the matters falling 
within their jurisdiction both on questions of law and fact (as outlined above, 
the SSA follows this construction by establishing two tribunals, the District 
Review Committee and the Social Security Authority). In consequence, the 
power of the courts is then restricted only to jurisdictional questions,32 
meaning that the scope of the judicial control is limited to the excess of 
jurisdiction or the ultra vires exercise of the powers. 33 The courts therefore 
examine and rule on errors relating to jurisdiction, i.e. they examine if the 
decision in question was in the authority of the Department to decide.34 
Although this principle seem to be quite precise, in practice distinctions 
between errors going to jurisdiction and those not so going can be impossible 
to draw. 35 
D Judicial Review In Germany 
There are a couple of differences between the judicial review of 
administrative power in common law countries and in Germany. First, 
administrative law matters are assigned specifically to the jurisdiction of the 
30 Above Scholtens, 2; C T Emery and B Smythe Judicial Review: Legal Limits of Official Power (Sweet 
& Maxwell, London, 1986) 201. 
31 Mary Scholtens Judicial Review -A11 introduction to administrative law (New Zealand Law Society 
Workshop, April 1999) l. 
32 Above Singh, 64. 
33 Above Emery/Smythe, 39, 40. 
34 SA De Smith Judicial Review of Administrative Action (4 ed, Stevens & Sons Limited, London, 1980) 
110. 
35 Above Emery/Smythe, 40. Sometimes even further distinctions are drawn between 'a lack of 
jurisdiction' and 'excess or abuse of jurisdiction' (above Aldous/Alder, 29.) and between the ultra vires of 
discretionary powers and of questions of law and fact (above de Smiths, 96.) . 
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admjnistrative courts, whereas in common law countries the ordinary courts 
also review the exercise of admjnistrative power. 36 Second, a tradHional 
common law power as to give remedy agajnst any rnegal action is unknown 
to the German system. The power of the German courts dependents only on 
the legislation that regulates their jurisdiction.37 Thirdly, where the common 
law courts can only uphold or invalidate an administrative action, but cannot 
correct or modify it,38 the German courts have all choices at hand as they can 
go both into questions of law as well as facts and can decide on the merits: 39 
they can invalidate, modify or change an administrative action, check errors 
commjtted within the jurisdiction and can also replace the administrative 
determination by their own.40 However, the scope of review is still, like the 
common law courts, confined to the legality of the action and does not 
extend to the examining of its expediency ("Zweckmassigkeit"). This is 
detemned by the doctrine of separation of powers: the courts shall not be 
allowed to question the reasoning of an Departmental decision as long as it 
stays within the legal limits.41 As Germany by its constitution commits itself 
being a Social State,42 this clause also binds the judiciary. The courts must 
interpret the laws in its light and, if necessary, order the administration to 
advise the citizen on the legal position and material facts. 43 This task is 
facilitated by the inquisitorial principle in the German courts: they are not 
dependent on the evidence presented to them, instead can demand and 
collect evidence considered necessary for the dispute in question.44 Another 
difference has finally to be marked: whereas m common law no 
administrative decision can be challenged on the grounds that it is not 
36 Above Singh, 64. 
37 Above Singh, 64, 66: In Germany, enforcement of the basic rights against the executive has been 
expressed in the Basic Law itself that the basic rights bind the executive in the same measure as the 
legislative and the judiciary and are directly enforceable law (Basic Law, Art. l (3) (Appendix II)) . In 
general, in Germany legislation is supported by the constitution and not any judicial evolved principle is 
the immediate basis of judicial review of administrative powers. 
38 Above Singh, 64. 
39 Above Singh, 64. 
40 Above Singh, 65. See also Section 113 of the Law of Administrative Courts (Appendix II). 
41 Above Singh, 71. This principle is stressed in the objections proceedings (further under IV) where the 
authority is empowered to go also into questions of legality and expediency. 
42 Art. 20(1) Basic Law (Appendix II). 
43 Above Singh, 8. 
44 Above Singh, 71. 
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consistent with good morals standards, administrative acts m Germany, 
which are violating these standards are null and void.45 
III THE REVIEW AND APPEAL PROCESS OF THE SOCIAL 
SECURITY ACT 1964 
A Historical Background 
In September 1938 the first Labour government enacted the Social Security 
Act, thereby laying the foundations of the modern welfare state in New 
Zealand. 
The aim of this legislation was, according to Prime Minister Michael Joseph 
Savage:46 
for the first time to provide, as generously as possible, for all person who have 
been deprived of the power to obtain a reasonable livelihood through age, illness , 
unemployment, widowhood or other misfortune. [ ... ] to make an end to poverty, 
to safeguard orphans and invalids against want and neglect and to free dependent 
individuals from being an economic burden to relatives and friends. 
Although these high ambitions were never fully realised, New Zealand's 
new social assistance programmes attracted wide international interest and 
much acclaim. Moreover, for at least four decades following the 
establishment of the Social Security Act there was solid, bipartisan support 
for the underlying principles of the welfare state. Of course, a reasonable 
level of economic growth, low unemployment, relative social stability and an 
observation that the various forms of social assistance provided were 
effective, fair and affordable, facilitated the nationwide support and 
acknowledgement.47 It is noticeable that the purpose of the Act did not 
change over the years, as the SSA 1964 simply refers to its predecessor and 
states that the purpose of the Act is to consolidate and amend the Social 
45 Above Singh, 77. Section 44 of the Law of Administrative Procedure 1976 declares: (1) An 
administrative act is null and void to the extent it suffers from a specially grave defect and such defect is 
evident on the appreciation of all the surrounding circumstances. 
46 Jonathan Boston, Paul Dalziel and Susan St John Redesigning the Welfare State in New Zealand: 
Problems, Policies, Prospects (Auckland, 1999), 3. 
47 Above Boston/Dalziel/St John, 3. 
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Security Act 1938 and its amendments.48 However, as the economic 
circumstances changed dramatically during the 1980s, the former support for 
the welfare state in general vanished. One of New Zealand's leading market 
liberals, Roger Kerr, even described the welfare state as "one of the seven 
deadly economic sins of the twentieth century".49 The critic and the policy 
change of the welfare system in a number of other countries was not without 
any effect: in the 1990s New Zealand undertook the most radical policy 
change in 60 years, and the major initiatives have included significant cuts in 
benefits and other forms of income support,50 a change which is too reflected 
in the various amendments and changes in the SSA during that time. 
B Structure 
The process for review and appeals under the Social Security Act is listed in 
Section lOA to 12R Social Security Act51 and distinguishes between the 
application to the District Review Committee (DRC),52 the application to the 
Appeal Authority and the appeal to the High Court and Court of appeal.53 
1 District Review Committee (DRC) 
(a) Jurisdiction 
The DRC has jurisdiction over decisions54 made by any persons in the 
exercise of any power, function or discretion conferred on the person by 
delegation under the SSA or under section l9D (l)(a) of the Social Welfare 
48 Social Security Act 1964, available at www.brookers.co.nz. (last accessed 20 October 2002). 
49 Above Boston/Dalziel/St John, 4. 
50 Above Boston/Dalziel/St John, 4. 
51 According to Section 81 SSA the Department has the authority to review decisions at any time (see 
Appendix I). This administrative review is, however, an internal procedure only and not part of the formal 
review process and is therefore not covered (for a detailed description see Wellington People Resource 
Center Benefit Fact File (Wellington, April 2001) 31. 
52 Legal Information Service (Inc) Legal Resource Manual (Auckland, November 2001) 66, refers to the 
DRC as the Benefit Review Committee (BRC). To avoid misunderstandings, thi paper uses only the 
term District Review Committee (DRC). 
53 For an overview see the diagram above Benefit Fact File 32. 
54 Although not stated in Section lOA, the DRC has also jurisdiction about a "determination" by the chief 
executive: according to Section 121 the appeal authority has jurisdiction over any "decision or 
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(Transitional Provisions) Act 1990 conferred on the decision making person 
by delegation under the SSA (Section lOA (l)(a) and (b)). This general 
jurisdiction is further delegated to the responsible local DRC (Section 
10A(2)).55 
(b) Form and Notice 
The application has to be in writing and has to be submitted within 3 months 
after receiving notification of the decision (Section lOA(lA) and (lB)(a)).56 
(c) Violation of Rights (Appellant) 
The SSA requires that either the applicant or the beneficiary (in case of a 
decision made under the Social Welfare Transitional Act: any other person) 
is affected by the decision (Section lOA(l)(a) and (b)).57 
(d) Scope of review 
The DRC has the power to confirm, vary or revoke the decision of the Chief 
Executive. Should the decision in question have been a purely discretionary 
one, the DRC can therefore decide on the matter upon its own discretion 
(Section 10A(8)).58 
2 Appeal Authority 
(a) Jurisdiction 
The appeal authority has jurisdiction over any decision or determination of 
the Chief Executive that has been confirmed or varied by a DRC. A direct 
application is allowed - without applying to the DRC first - if the decision in 
determination" of the chief executive which is confirmed or varied by a DRC (Section 12J( 1)), meaning 
that a determination can be too subject of a review for the DRC. 
55 For the text of the SSA Section lOA, 12J, 12K, 12M, 12Q and 12R see Appendix I. 
56 See Appendix I. 
57 See Appendix I. 
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question was made by the Chief Executive other than pursuant to a 
delegation (Section 12J(l) and (lA)). 59 Exceptions to the jurisdiction are 
listed in Section 12J(2) (appeals on medical grounds).60 
(b) Form and Notice 
The application has to be in writing and shall state the grounds of appeal and 
the relief sought (Section 12K (1) and (2))61 and has to be submitted within 
three months with the secretary of the appeal authority (Section 12K lA(a) 
and lB (a)). 62 
(c) Violation of rights (appellant) 
The SSA requires that either the applicant or the beneficiary is affected by 
the decision (Section 12J(l) and (lA)). 63 
(d) Scope of review 
The appeal authority has the power to confirm, modify or reverse the 
decision or determination appealed against (Section 12M(7)64 and may refer 
the matter back to the chief executive for further consideration (Section 
12M(8)),65 who is obliged to take all necessary steps to carry the decision 
into effect (Section 12P).66 
3 High Court 
(a) Jurisdiction 
58 See Appendix I. 
59 See Appendix I. 
60 See Appendix I. 
61 See Appendix I. 
62 See Appendix I. 
63 See Appendix I. 
64 See Appendix I. 
65 See Appendix I. 
66 See Appendix I. 
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The High Court has jurisdiction only over determinations of the authority 
which are erroneous in a point of law (Section 12Q(l).67 
(b) Form and Notice 
The (written) notice of appeal has to be lodged within 14 days with the 
secretary of the authority and in within another 14 days the appellant has to 
set out the facts and the grounds of determination, specifying the question of 
law on which the appeal is made. A failure to this requirement may lead to 
the Chairman of the authority to certify that the case has not been prosecuted 
(Section 12Q (3) and (4) and (8)) .68 
(c) Violation of rights (appellants) 
A dissatisfaction with any determination of the authority is required (Section 
12Q (1)). 69 
(d) Scope of review 
The High Court rules on a question of law only (Section 12Q (1)) . 
IV THE GERMAN REVIEW AND APPEAL PROCESS 
A History Of The Social Law System 
It has long been recognized in Germany that the state had a special role and 
function in promoting social welfare. This idea originated from the earlier 
feudal view that, as long as the peasant fulfilled his obligations towards the 
appropriate authority, he had a right to expect adequate provision of his 
material need.70 In reaction to the changes in the late 19th century Kaiser 
67 See Appendix I. 
68 See Appendix I. 
69 See Appendix I. 
70 Gerhard A Ritter Social Welfare i11 Germany and Britain - Origins and Development (Berg Publishers 
Ltd., Southampton, 1986), 17. 
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Wilhelm I. determined in his "kaiserliche Botschaft" (emperor's message) 
the claim of the population to material security. In a quite similar statement 
as to the first New Zealand Social Security Act, the preamble to the first 
draft of the accident insurance law of 8 March 1881 stated that 'the 
unpropertied classes, which were at once the most numerous and least 
educated among the population' be shown by means of 'directly tangible 
advantages' that 'the state does not exist merely out of necessity or is simply 
created for the better situated classes in society', but is a benevolent 
'institution also serving their needs and interests. ' 71 With this statement, the 
first step to a German Social Insurance had been done, establishing the first 
comprehensive legal compendium of the world for a social security of the 
workers and employees.72 In 1975 a first collection of the Social Law was 
established in the Book of Social Law I and nowadays the German Social 
Law is codified in the 11 books of Statutes of Social Law73 and comprises 
several areas of law, one of which is the Social Insurance Scheme.74 The 
Social Law System distinguishes between applicants for unemployment 
benefits and social benefits.75 The Federal Employment Ministry is 
responsible for the unemployment scheme, whereas the responsibility for 
Social Benefit Scheme lies with the Federal Social Ministry.76 Although the 
71 Above Ritter, 34. 
72 In 1883 the Health Care Insurance was introduced, followed 1884 by the Occupational Accident 
Insurance and 1889 by the Disability and Aging Insurance for workers. For more details about the history 
and the development of the Social Insurance and Social Law in Germany compare the extensive 
description on www.erzieluu1g.u11i-giessen.de/studis!Robert!soz vers.lztml and www.er;:.ie/wng.u11i-
giesse11.delstudis!Robertlgesetze. html (last accessed 22 October 2002). 
73 Besides these 11 books, the Employment- Promotion - Act ("Arbeitsfoerdungsgesetz") and the Federal 
Law on Social Benefits ("Bundessozialhilfegesetz") also comprise important regulations. 
74 Social Insurance is, according to a common German definition, "a provisional system, invented by the 
state and based on a compulsory insurance duty. Its task is to prevent certain risk to occur and, should 
these risks occur, to equalize in full or part the unexpected expenditures and losses on wages under 
special consideration of social objectives." It is commonly described as consisting of five pillars: Health 
Insurance, Pension Insurance, Promotion of Employment, Occupational Accident Insurance and Long-
term Care Insurance. For a more detailed description ww1v.erziehu11g.11ni-
giesse11.de!st11dis!Robertlso; defi.lzt111/ (last accessed at 22 October 2002). 
75 An applicant who becomes unemployed is first entitled for unemployment payment 
("Arbeitslosengeld", currently between 60 - 67% of his last (net) wage). The period for which he is 
entitled for this payment depends on his age and how long he has been working in the last 7 years (see for 
further details the table on www.arbeitsa111r.de/hstlservices/111erkblatt!111balo/111b3.ht,n/, last accessed on 
20 October 2002). After the expiration of this period the applicant is entitled for unemployment aid 
("Arbeitslosenhilfe", currently between 53-57% of his last net wage). Unemployment aid is, in principle, 
~aid without any timely limitation. 
6 Due to the federal system in Germany, each of the 16 countries ("Bundeslander") has its own Social 
Ministry and is responsible for the organization and allocation of the Regional Social Departments 
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Social Law has become extremely complex and complicated over the years, 
the review and appeal process follows a quite simple and easy structure, 
which was basically established in the Law of Administrative Procedure 
1976 and Law on Administrative Courts 1960.77 
B Structure 
All decisions of administrative authorities affecting individual rights can be 
challenged in courts: this is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, Article 
19(4) of the German Basic Law. 78 The relevant review and appeal process is 
standardised regulated in two federal Acts, the Law on Administrative 
Courts 1960 and the Law of Administrative Procedure 1976.79 Three levels 
of administrative courts have been instituted80 and process before these 
courts 1s regulated by the Law on Administrative Courts 1960 
("Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung"). 81 At the bottom are the lower 
administrative courts ("Verwaltungsgerichte"), in the middle the higher 
administrative courts ("Oberverwaltungsgerichte") and at the top is the 
Federal Administrative Court ("Bundesverwaltungsgericht"). 
1 Administrative objections proceedings ( "Widerspruchsverfahren ") 
This proceeding is required pnor to any judicial review and has to be 
initiated at latest one month after the recipient receives the decision of the 
("Sozialamter"). Accordingly, the same structure exists for the Employment Ministries and the 
Employment Departments; for the administrative organization in Germany see above Singh 12, 16. 
77 The review and appeals process is basically the same in all areas of administrative law and is based on 
the structure of the review and appeals process established in the Law of Administrative Procedure 1976 
and Law on Administrative Courts 1960. For example, the Law on Social Courts 1975 (available at 
www.gesetzesweb.de/i11dexl./1t111!, last accessed 20 October 2002) provides in Section 77 - 122 for a 
review and appeal process, but these sections basically copy the process described in the Federal Law of 
Administrative Procedure 1976 and Law on Administrative Courts 1960 and do not deviate from it. Also 
the Section l - 66 in the X. Book of Social Statutes ("SGB X") correspond to the regulations in the 
Federal Law of Administrative Procedure 1976. For a more detailed comparison see 
www.h1ra.uos.de/prof/udschi11g/11d OJ.pelf (last accessed 20 October 2002). 
78 See Appendix II. 
79 Above Singh, appendix II and III, 164 - 183. The only difference being the jurisdiction, as appeals in 
social law are directed to the Social Courts and appeals in regards to unemployment schemes are directed 
to the normal Administrative Courts. For an overview about the administrative courts system in Germany: 
above Singh, 102 - 115. 
80 Section 2 of the Law on Administrative Courts 1960. 
81 Above Singh, Appendix III, 181 - 183. 
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Department. The administrative Act82 in question is first examined through 
the issuing Department, which, should it not change, alter or modify it, 
transfers the matter then to the next Department higher in the hierarchy. This 
supervising Department reviews the original decision in respect of any legal 
aspect (including the exercise of discretion), and issues either a new decision 
or confirms the original decision. 83 It is one special feature of the 
"Widerspruchsverfahren" that the final decision can, in its consequences for 
the appellant, be more disadvantageous than the original decision.84 
2 Judicial review 
Both the Department and the appellant can appeal to the courts of the first 
instance, the administrative courts, which have original jurisdiction. They 
cover aJI questions of law and fact however difficult or important they may 
be.85 The lower courts may go both into questions of law and facts about the 
validity of the administrative action and may also, in certain cases , substitute 
their own decision for that of the Department. Like with the common law 
courts, this is confined to the legality of the action and does not extend to 
examining its expediency ("Zweckmassigkeit"), although its scope 1s, m 
reality, quite wider,86 as it is expressed in Section 114 of the Law on 
Administrative Courts 1960: 
So far as the administrative authorities are authorized to act in their discretion the 
courts also examine whether the administrative Act or its refusal or omission is 
82 The administrative act ("Verwaltungsakt") is a core concept of the German administrative law. It 
covers most of the action of the administrative authorities through which they affect the legal interests of 
an individual. Section 35 of the Law of Administrative Procedure of 1976 defines the administrative act 
in the following words: "Administrative act is every order, decision or other sovereign measure taken by 
an authority for the regulation of a particular case in the sphere of public law and directed at immediate 
external legal consequences." For the various characteristics on Section 35 above Singh, 32 - 36. 
83 Section 68 - 74 Law on Administrative Courts 1960. 
84 By contrast, this consequence and if the scope of review for the DRC is limited only to the issues raised 
by the claimant, is not stated in the SSA and quite contentious: above Legal Resource Manual, 69, 70, 
mentions a case currently under appeal in which a beneficiary had the decision of the Department to 
cancel two of his benefit payment reviewed. Although the application addressed only one decision of the 
Department, the DRC also ruled about another decision which was not part of the review application, on 
the grounds that" any appeal is a rehearing and therefore everything can be litigated again". The authority 
in its interim decision did not state clearly if the DRC has had the jurisdiction to rule about the decision 
not questioned, but seems inclined to allow the Department - although the Department itself is not 
allowed to appeal - to raise the issue in the process. 
85 Above Singh, 112. 
86 Above Singh, 71. 
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illegal because the statutory limits of the discretion have been exceeded or 
because the discretion has not been exercised for the purpose of the 
authorization. 
Further, Section 40 of the Law on Administrative Procedure 1976 lays down: 
If an administrative authority is authorized to act in its discretion, it has to 
exercise its discretion in consonance with the purpose of the authorization and 
the legal limits of the discretion have to be observed . 
From the lower courts there is an appeal to the higher administrative courts. 
These courts are primarily courts of appeal and hear appeals against the final 
judgements of the lower administrative courts. 87 Both the Department and 
the appellant can apply to the Federal Administrative Court, which 1s 
primarily a court of revision and rules over a question of law only. 88 
V APPLICATION OF THE SSA 
A Meaning Of Decision v Determination 
The review and appeals process is only applicable if a "decision" (Section 
lOA SSA) or a "decision or determination" (Section 12J (1)) is challenged. 
As no further explanation is given in the Act whether the nature of the 
decision or determination , one might conclude that every decision or 
determination is reviewable, irrespective of its nature as long as the applicant 
is affected. However, the courts have not been following this wide 
interpretation. Especially two court decisions, Wharerimu89 and Moody,90 
have narrowed the scope of the review process and limited the position of 
the applicants quite considerably, with far reaching effects. 
1 Wharerimu 
The High Court had to decide in Wharerimu whether or not the appeal 
87 For a detailed description of the jurisdiction of Administrative Courts: above Singh, 112, 113 . 
88 Above Singh, 113. 
89 Wharerimu v Chief Executive of Department of Work and Income [2000] NZAR 467 (HC) per 
Baragwanath J. 
90 Moody v Department of Work and Income [2001) NZAR 608 (HC) per Young J. 
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authority was right denying its jurisdiction to review the decision to search 
the house of a beneficiary, Mrs. Wharerimu. The search was conducted to 
ascertain whether she remained entitled to receive her benefit and Mrs. 
Wharerimu claimed that officers of the Department of Social Welfare pushed 
their way in and forced her to allow them to search her home for evidence.91 
The search lead to no results and, after an unsuccessful application to the 
DRC, Mrs. Wharerimu appealed to the Social Security Appeal Authority. 
The authority did not consider that the visit was conducted in an 
unreasonable way and also expressed no final view of evidence, but found it 
lacked jurisdiction and therefore dismissed the appeal. The High Court had 
to decide about two questions (formulated for appeal under Rules 4, 5, and 9 
High Court Rules), whether Mrs. Wharerimu had a right to appeal under 
Section 121(1) SSA against a decision made under Section lOA(l) when the: 
a) decision related to manner of undertaking interview and search under 
Section 12 and Section 81; and 
b) no decision was made as result of such interview and search to vary 
appellant's benefit. 
The court held that the use of the double expression "decision or 
determination" in Section 121(1) could be due to a number of reasons and 
concluded, "that "decision" may be apt to embrace operative conclusions of 
the Chief Executive's delegate as an administrator, and "determination" the 
more formal operative conclusion of the Authority."92 Defining the purpose 
of the Act as "about the promotion of Social Security for New Zealanders in 
need of public assistance" and that "it means of promoting that purpose are, 
however, essentially financial.", 93 the court reached the conclusion (in 
reference to Section 12K(4)(d))94 that the undertaking of an interview and 
search did not fit in these categories (as it did not have any financial 
91 According to Section 81SSA the Chief executive is empowered to review any benefit in order to 
a certain whether the beneficiary remains entitled to receive it (see Appendix I) . 
92 Above Wharerimu, 478, 479. 
93 Above Wharerimu, 477. 
94 See Appendix I. 
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consequences) and could therefore not be reviewable. The appeal was 
dismissed. 
2 Moody 
In Moody v Department of Work and Income the court had to decide 
whether the "decision" that an overpayment had been made is reviewable or 
not. It was an undisputed fact that Mrs. Moody received domestic purposes 
benefits (DPB) payments between 1995 and 1997 for which she was not 
entitled to, but it was also acknowledged that, had she not been receiving the 
DPB, she would have been entitled to other payments from the Department. 
The Department's position, however, was that, as the schemes of the SSA do 
not allow benefits to be granted with retrospective effect, no offset can be 
allowed and her liability to the Department remains in the full amount of the 
overpayment (at $32,324.39). 95 The court acknowledged a general right at 
common law to recover money paid under mistake of fact,96 as well as the 
specific statutory provision in Section 86 SSA.97 As for Section 86 SSA, the 
court held that the Director-General is basically empowered to take on three 
decisions under it: 98 
a) To take proceedings to recover an over- payment. 
b) To put in place an offset arrangement in relation to future benefit 
payments. 
c) To write-off provisionally apparent liabilities. 
The court expressed that (contrary to the opmton of the Social Security 
Authority) "Section 81 (3) of the Act does not permit the retrospective 
crediting of benefits".99 Also, the court acknowledged that, should the 
Department decide not to write off the overpayment, Mrs. Moody could 
95 Above Moody, 611. 
96 Above Moody, 612. 
97 See Appendix I. 
98 Above Moody, 620. 
99 Above Moody, 625. 
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defend herself under Section 94B Judicature Act 1908 100 as she believed that 
she was entitled for the benefits she received (and spent the money which 
was paid to her). 101 Therefore, on any claim by the Department to recover 
the overpayments, Mrs. Moody could have at least set-off her entitlements to 
any other benefits which she would have otherwise received against her 
liability to the Department. 102 Further considering that it was most unlikely 
that Mrs. Moody would ever receive income other than by way of state 
benefits and that therefore any repayments would come out of future 
benefits, the court concluded that the indebtedness ought provisionally to be 
written-off pursuant to Section 86(9A) SSA. 103 
Although the court did not expressively made a reference to the distinction 
between "decision" and "determination", it held, comparable to the 
statements in Wharerimu: 104 
When the Director- General decides to rely on powers of offset, a necessary step 
in such a decision is a conclusion as to the amount of the over-payment. In such 
a case the decision to "establish an over-payment" can fairly be regarded as 
being a statutory decision under s86. [ ... ] In cases where no offset is involved, 
the "establishment of an overpayment" is simply a matter of Departmental 
practise with no legal effect and, indeed, no practical effect on the recipient of 
the alleged over-payment. In such a case, I am of the view that the "establishing 
of an over-payment" cannot be regarded , in itself, as a decision under s86 for the 
purposes of review and appeal rights. 
3 Discretion 
The scope of review for the courts to examine discretionary powers is in 
principle confined to the legality of the action and does not extend to 
examining its expediency. In common law, the reasoning behind this rule is 
the understanding that the legislature in its wisdom has assigned a job to the 
administrative authority and so long as it performs that job within the legal 
100 Above Moody, 612: "Relief[ ... ] shall be denied wholly or in part if the person from whom the relief is 
sought received the payment in good faith[ ... ]". 
101 Above Moody, 612, and 627: "Had she not been receiving those payments, her spending patterns 
would have been different." 
102 Above Moody, 613 . 
103 Above Moody, 627 . 
104 Above Moody, 621. 
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limits set by the legislature, the court cannot review its decision. 105 It is, 
however, recognized, that, especially in social security appeals, whenever a 
decision is taken that adversely affects an individual, he or she should be 
able to appeal against it, if only because such decision must be founded upon 
a sound legal base, not upon the arbitrary decision of an official. 106 All 
claimants for benefit are entitled to have their claims decided by a proper 
procedure and in accordance with the relevant legal rules. Moreover, even 
where benefits are discretionary, no public body can operate such a scheme 
responsibly without developing administrative rules to govern the exercise of 
official discretion. 107 These principles follow the general idea, that, if an 
authority goes beyond the limits imposed by the statute in question on which 
it operates, it acts ultra vires. The superior court may then, if necessary, 
quash or prohibit the ultra vires decision or act and order the authority to 
exercise its discretion according to law, or make declarations. 108 However, 
this approach, as consequent and logical as it seems, has only been recently 
developed. The very idea that special principles should apply to 
departmental actions has long not been accepted in the common law 
tradition. 109 Furthermore, matters of discretion were considered as not 
suitable for judicial review for two reasons: first, as the decisions by nature 
can be highly political or politically sensitive and second, that a paiticular 
issue can be unsuited to be resolved by the courts. 110 Additionally, in cases 
where the jurisdiction is transferred to special tribunals to decide on the 
relevant disputes, the courts are even more reluctant to rule about (or 
against) departmental decisions. 111 For example, the Court of Appeal held in 
Regina v Preston Supplementary Benefits Appeal Tribunal: 112 
105 Above Singh, 71. 
106 Above Wade/ Bradley, 648. 
107 Above Wade/Bradley, 648 . 
108 Above Emery/Smythe, 201. Still, some argue that there is a remaining discretion for the court not to 
intervene even when the authorities decision is ultra vires: above Aldou /Alder, 114. 
109 DJ Galligan Discretionary Powers -A Legal Study of Official Discretion (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1986) 221. 
110 Above Galligan, 241. 
111 Above Peter Robson Judicial Review and Social Security in Trevor Buck Judicial Review and Social 
Welfare (Pinter, London, 1998) 90, 106. Compare too the statement of the court above Moody, 621: 
"Considerations such as these, along with some of the problems thrown up by this and other cases, may 
point to the desirability of a general tidying up of the relevant statutory provisions." 
112 Regina v. Sheffield Supplementary Benefits Appeal Tribunal [1975) l WLR 624,631 (CA). 
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The courts should hesitate long before interfering [ ... ] with the decisions of the 
appeal tribunals. [ ... ] The courts should not enter into a meticulous discussion 
about of the meaning of this or that word in the Act. They should leave the 
tribunals to interpret the Act in a broad reasonable way, according to the spirit 
and not to the letter: especially as Parliament has given them a way of alleviating 
any hardship. 
This reluctance not to interfere with administrative bodies, whose decisions 
have already been reviewed by the relevant legislative tribunal, is also 
palpable in Moody. 113 There, the court held that "in practice, Departmental 
officers exercise discretions in relation to the recovery of over-payments 
which lie outside the strict scope of Section 86." However, the court refused 
to examine the grounds leading to the Departmental decision and expressed 
that114 
Further, I am uneasy about rights of appeal being conferred to beneficiaries 
which enable a beneficiary to test, on appeal, assessments made by the 
Department which relate not to the underlying merits of the beneficiary's 
position but rather to considerations which are really internal to the Department, 
that is whether recovery action in a particular case is, in fact, worthwhile. 
There is, however, no legal reason to establish that every discretionary 
decision is non-justiciable and the following analysis shows that the court 
had had the opportunity in Moody to go deeper into the other underlying 
facts and conclusions drawn by the authority. 
VI ANALYSE AND COMPARISON 
A Wharerimu 
In Wharerimu, the court made two very distinctive statements, which have 
and will have considerable impact on future appeals of beneficiaries: 
First, the court agreed with the argumentation of the Department that the 
words "decision" and "determination" are "interchangeable", 115 and that it 
11 3 Above Moody, 621. 
114 Above Moody, 621. 
115 Above Wharerimu, 477 (position of the Department) and 478:" [ . .. ] I am satisfied that Mr. Liddel' s 
construction strikes a fair balance between the protection of disadvantaged New Zealanders against abuse 
and the need for a system that will operate without unreasonable interference." 
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would be pedantic to "infer that there is an essential difference of kind or 
degree between the concepts".' 16 The second statement referred to the 
purpose of the Act itself, to which the court held that it was only a decision 
that had an economic effect on the person affected, which could be a 
reviewable decision under the Act. 117 
The statement that there is no practical difference between decision and 
determination is not convincing at all. Interpretations of statutes have to keep 
first of all to the wording' 18 of the statute and "ignoring the existence of a 
word in statute on the basis that it was inserted by mistake is an 
interpretative tool of last resort".' 19 That the courts should be very reluctant 
to interpret statutes too narrowly was also clearly expressed in Boulton v 
Director General of Social Welfare: 120 
[ ... ] in the absence of any assistance from the legislature within the Act, and in 
the absence of any authority to the contrary, this court should be reluctant to 
limit rights of appeal granted by the legislature under sl2J unless there is the 
clearest language. 
It is not clear, why the court ventured in a long discussion about the nature 
and definition of a determination 121 to finally conclude that the "analysis of 
the expression"(s) do "not provide an answer to this case". 122 As the SSA 
uses both the expressions "decision" and "determination" it is for the 
Department and the courts to respect this differentiation. One possible -and 
quite obvious- interpretation could be that both expressions refer to 
departmental decisions, but "determination" also includes statements by the 
Department without any - immediate - legal or financial effect, for example 
the eligibility of a beneficiary to attend a work test. 
116 Above Wharerimu, 478. 
11 7 Above Wharerimu, 477: "Its [the SSA] means of promoting that purpose are, however, essentially 
financial." 
118 Compare for example Section 5 Interpretation Act 1999: (1) The meaning of an enactment must be 
ascertained from its text and in the light of its purpose. (available at www.brookers.co.11z, last accessed 
22 October 2002). 
119 Above Moody, 616. 
120 Boulton v Director General of Social Welfare (1990) NZFLR 32, 35 (HC) per Doogue J. 
121 Above Wharerimu, 478. 
122 Above Wharerimu, 479. 
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It becomes clear and obvious that also departmental "determinations" have 
to be accessible for a review, when considering the following statement in 
Moody that: 123 
[I]n cases where no offset is involved, the "establishment of an over-payment" is 
simply a matter of Departmental practice with no legal effect and , indeed, no 
practical effect on the recipient of the alleged over- payment. 
Although not explicitly referring to Wharerimu, the court here states that the 
factual 'determination' of an overpayment has no practical, i.e., financial or 
economic effect to the applicant (as the court also does in Wharerimu by 
determining that only decisions with an economic effect on the side of the 
applicant can be reviewable). 124 Apparently, the courts do not acknowledge 
that the establishment of the over payment (the determination) is conditional 
to the departmental decision to either claim an overpayment or to write it off. 
The determination - overpayment yes/no - is therefore an integral part of the 
final decision and must be subject to a review as it already affects the 
recipient (financially). 125 Considering the statement of the court that: 126 
[the word 'provisional ' has the meaning] that any decision to write-off a debt is 
provisional, i.e. it can be revisited by the Director- General at any time he or she 
chooses; for instance if the Director-General later comes to the view that the 
recipient did not, in fact, act in good faith . 
it is obvious that the two statements of the court (decision equals 
determination and only economic decisions can be reviewable) can not be 
upheld. If indeed the Director - General can, at any time, decide to establish 
or to write off an overpayment, it is a requirement of a fair administrative 
procedure to allow the beneficiary as well at any time to have his obligation 
to repay the overpayment - if this is justified or not - determined by the 
court. 
In comparison, a German court confronted with the Wharerimu - case would 
take a different approach (on the basis of the German statutes and 
123 Above Moody, 621. 
124 Above Wharerimu, 477 . 
125 For another example above Legal Resource Manual, 64. 
126 Above Moody, 616. 
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regulations): first, a discussion about the meaning of "decision v 
determination" would not take place. The Law on Administrative Courts 
1960 sees in Section 43 for a special (declaratory) suit ("Feststellungsklage") 
to demand the court to declare the existence or non- existence of a legal 
relationship. 127 Required is only a legal interest in the declaration on the side 
of the appellant. So, even without the specific reference of the relevant Act 
to a 'decision' or 'determination', a beneficiary can demand at any time that 
the court decide whether a determination or a decision of the relevant 
Department, irrespective of its economic impact to the beneficiary, is legally 
correct. A German administrative court would therefore decide and answer 
the question whether the search of Mrs. Wharerimus house was justified (due 
to the inquisitorial system, it would not even be necessary for Mrs. 
Wharerimu, to pose the question) and the appeal would have been 
allowed. 128 Second, the German court would also not go into questions about 
the nature of the underlying social legislation. The purpose of the Social Law 
Statutes is for almost every statute explained in the Act itself, 129 and 
therefore the courts normally not venture into a further interpretation. 
However, the German Court would surely confirm the submissions put 
forward by Mrs. Wharerimu, that the function of the Social Security 
Legislation is to protect the dignity of the beneficiaries, and that the statute is 
concerned with more than money, 130 as this are indeed aspects of the very 
idea behind the German Social System. 
B Moody 
In Moody, the court decided that a retrospective permission of benefits is not 
allowed by the Act, but that, due to Mrs. Moody successful defence against a 
claim by the Department to recover the paid benefits, the payments should 
127 Section 43 of the Law on Administrative Courts 1960 reads: "Declaration of the existence or non-
existence of a legal relationship, or the nullity of an administrative act, may be demanded through a suit, 
if the plaintiff has a legal interest in a prompt declaration (declaration suit)." 
128 A different question is, however, how a German administrative court would decide on the question 
whether the search of Mrs. Wharerimus was justified or not. This is discussed later under C. 
129 Compare, for example, the extensive description of the purpose of the Act in the first Book of Statutes 
of Social Law ("SGB I"), Section 1, available at 
www.bma.de/download/gesetze web/SgbOl/sgbOlxOl.htm (last accessed 26 September 2002). 
130 Above Wharerimu, 475 . 
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be written off. Again, in companson, a German court would take on a 
different approach, mainly because this problem has already been considered 
in the relevant legislation: the question whether an applicant is liable for on 
overpayment of benefits is regulated in Section 50 of the 10th Book of 
Statutes of Social Law. 131 According to Section 50, the beneficiary must 
repay the benefits he received without entitlement. However, the Department 
cannot demand a repayment if the beneficiary had reason to rely on his or 
her entitlement to receive the benefits. In this respect, the Act defines a 
general assumption that the recovery of overpayments (or payments to which 
the beneficiary was not entitled to) is excluded should the beneficiary spend 
all the money received. 132 Both assumptions are fulfilled in Moody: Mrs. 
Moody had in fact spent all the benefits she received, and she was generally 
entitled to receive benefits. That she was not entitled for the benefits she 
actually received, does not rule out her acting in good faith, as there was no 
indication for her to question the payments 133 (the payments she received 
were in fact almost in the same amount as the payments she would have been 
legally entitled to receive). In consequence, the court would rule that the 
Department couldn't recover the overpayment. 134 
C Discretion 
In Wharerimu, the court, due to the limited scope of review assigned in this 
special case, 135 did not rule about whether the decision of the Department to 
search Mrs. Wharerimus house was unlawful or not. However, a German 
court would in the scope of a 'declaration suit', 136 decide on this 
131 Section 50 SGB X available at http://www.sozialgesetzbuch.de/ge etze/sgbx/index.html (last accessed 
22 October 2002). 
132 Section 45 11(2) SGB X available at http://www.sozialgesetzbuch.de/gesetze/sgbx/index.html (la t 
accessed 22 October 2002). 
133 Above Moody, 612,613. 
134 In case of deliberately, wrongful declarations whether the entitlement of benefit payments , the 
Department can of course claim the overpaid amount back. However, the Department is only allowed to 
cut off 20% of the benefit for a period of 2 years to recover the overpayment. An overpayment due to a 
mistake of the Department can not be recollected; for this case the act sees for a general offset -
prohibition (Section 25a I Federal Social Law - for more details ee www.soziales-
koeln.de/sozialhil fe/r I.html (last accessed 22 October 2002). 
135 Above Wharerimu, 469 : the court had to decide on two questions imposed according to RR 4,5, and 9 
of the High Court Rules (above VA 1). 
136 Above footnote 127. 
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discretionary issue and its approach and outcome would, again, be different 
from a New Zealand or other common law court. This is partly because, 
although the scope of judicial review in Germany is also confined to the 
legality of the administrative action, its operation becomes much wider than 
in common law. 137 Discretion of the administrative authorities is not 
discretion free from all legal limits, instead it is judicious discretion to be 
exercised for the purpose it is granted. 138 Further, where the common law 
system only has one category of ultra vires exercise of discretion, the 
German system distinguishes between excess and abuse of discretion. 139 By 
applying these standards, the German court would review the departmental 
decision to search Mrs. Wharerimu's house according to the Principle of 
Reasonableness ("Verhaeltnismassigkeit"). 140 This comprises of the three 
limbs Suitability (of various means the authority must use the most suitable), 
Necessity (the means which causes the minimum injury must be employed) 
and Proportionality (the intrusion into the rights of an individual must not be 
out of proportion to the aspired ends). 141 Although the given facts don 't 
allow for a definite evaluation as how a German court would finally decide, 
it can be said, that the search of Mrs. Wharerimus house does not seem to be 
proportional. The search and intrusion of a private house has to be the last 
measure and should only be reserved to serious, criminal offences. To assess 
whether someone is still entitled for benefit payments can hardly justify such 
a severe measure. 142 It is therefore quite likely that a German court would 
consider the aspired end - the establishment if Mrs. Wharerimu is still 
137 Above Singh, 71. 
138 Above Singh, 83. 
139 Above Singh, 85. 
140 Assuming, that the relevant facts gave enough reason for the Department to actually consider a search 
and that the relevant act provides for such a measure to be taken by the Department. (Remark: it is not 
clear, however, according to which section of the SSA the Department considered itself entitled to search 
Mrs. Wharerimus house. It is quite questionable if the Department does have the power at all to conduct 
searches of homes of beneficiaries, but this topic can ' t be covered in this paper (and this was no issue in 
the review and appeal process either). For example, in Germany, even when the relevant legislation 
empowers the relevant administrative body to conduct a search into a private house, it has to be approved 
by a judge beforehand regardless which administrative body conduct it. This applies too for the police 
and there are only very limited exceptions (and, again, these exceptional circumstances can be reviewed 
through a court by means of a 'declaration suit'). 
141 Literally "Verhaeltnismassigkeit" can be translated as proportionality, but the true and most exact 
correspondence is found in the common law principle of reasonableness. For a detailed description above 
Singh, 88-92. 
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entitled for benefits - compared to the intrusion into her rights as way out of 
proportion and rule this decision 'ultra vires'. 
By way of this comparison, it becomes apparent that decisions like the one to 
search the house of a beneficiary - which have indeed no economic effect, 
but can be very humiliating to the affected beneficiary - have to be 
reviewable: although no decision was made by the Department after the 
search (there was therefore no economic impact on Mrs. Wharerimu's side), 
it has to be considered -and that's not a far fetched proposition- that the 
Department might decide later on that again a search is necessary to 
ascertain her entitlement for benefit payments. The courts ruling that the first 
search was not proportional (ultra vires) would then prohibit the Department 
to carry out its decision and protect Mrs. Wharerimu (which is now not the 
case). 
The discretionary aspect worth analysing in Moody has a different focus: it 
has already been explained, that, in common law, if a public body is under a 
duty to perform a certain act, it is possible for the High Court to order the act 
to be done. However, the High Court cannot require that a power be 
exercised in any particular way. Instead it can only require that the discretion 
lying behind the decision to exercise a power be used lawfully. 143 Although 
the court did not refer to this principle, it explains its statement that internal 
decisions of the Department can or should not be reviewed. 144 However, the 
decision in Moody is not compulsory: even assuming that discretionary 
decisions are, to a certain degree not justiciable, there are other aspects 
suitable for review. The courts can, for example, examine whether there is 
enough foundation of evidence, for finding of facts or whether the decision 
strategies are supported by rational considerations. 145 (In fact, although 
restricted to jurisdictional questions, the courts often go into questions of the 
142 It is also not clear from the given facts if the Department has considered other alternatives as to 
establish Mrs. Wharerimu's entitlement (for example the request to disclose relevant facts, plus 
supportive statutory declarations etc .) . 
143 Above Aldous/Alder, 5. 
144 Above footnote 114. 
145 Above Galligan, 246. 
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merits.) 146 These standards equal very much the German categories of 
excess, failure or abuse of discretion 147 (and come close into the region of 
the Principle of Reasonableness). The statement in Moody, that as the 
decisions of the Department were internal, they are not reviewable, is 
therefore not correct (and certainly not fair). It was in the power of the court 
to actually review the departmental decision leading to the off-set by 
applying the standards set out above. Of course, this examination would go 
deeper into the internal fact- finding process of the Department and would 
involve a more thorough investigation as by (simply) applying the ultra vires 
doctrine only. Not to forget: the standards applied don't allow for a review of 
the expediency of the Departmental decisions, instead the examination 
would still be restricted to legal questions (as required by law). Also, it 
would not interfere with the fact, that the court in common law can not set up 
his own investigations: should the Department not be able to prove that it has 
acted fairly and can't explain under which rationale considerations it has 
reached the decision to search Mrs. Wharerimu ' s house, the court ruling had 
to be in favour for the beneficiary. 
VII CONCLUSION 
The Social Security Act 1964 appears to be very flawed and insufficient after 
the comparison with the German Social Law System, but to blame all the 
critic above to a flawed legislation, is too simple. However, starting point for 
any critic (and reform) must be the missing preamble of the Act. Lack of a 
sufficient and extensive parliamentary explanation as to the purpose of the 
Act leads, consequently, to two different phenomena: on the one hand, it 
creates confusion on the side of the Department as to which extent it can 
exercise its power. Statements of the court as the one in Hall that "the 
Director- General should be proactive in seeing to welfare and not defensive 
or bureaucratic" 148 show an apparent misunderstanding on part of the 
Department about its position towards beneficiaries. Without guidelines 
146 Above Singh, 64. 
147 Above Singh, 86,87 . 
148 Hall v D-GSW [1997] NZFLR 902,921 (HC) per McGechan J. 
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from parliament and shaped through experience of the decline of the general 
welfare state idea in New Zealand, it is not surprising that the Department 
adopted a restrictive, and somehow defensive, policy as to the distribution 
(and recollection) of benefit payments. On the other hand, also the courts 
can't refer to an established interpretation and are forced to decide on a case-
to-case basis and seem to be inclined to follow close the narrow application 
of the Department, arguably because of its expertise in this field as assigned 
. b h I I . I . 149 to 1t y t ere evant eg1s at1on. 
A second flaw it's the structure of the review and appeal system. Its not only 
- unnecessary - complicated: the establishing of two tribunals as review 
authorities (the DRC and the SSAA) before an appeal to the courts 1s 
applicable, with different requirement as to its jurisdiction is prone to 
misleading interpretations (the very extent is shown above in Wharerimu). 
Also, considering that both the DRC and the SSAA are in fact quite closely 
linked to the Department, one is allowed to question their impartiality. 1so 
And it's a matter of common sense, that principles of openness, fairness and 
impartiality are more likely to be maintained whenever Parliament does not 
leave it to an authority to make its decisions in the manner it thinks best. 1s1 
As for the position of the courts: administrative law and the review of 
administrative decisions are all about control of the requirements of the 
relevant legislation and the internal procedures leading to these decisions. 
Public bodies are not on the same level as normal citizens; they are 
exercising the power of the state and with this power comes the obligation 
not only to act fairly, but also to disclose the underlying principles leading to 
the relevant decisions. It is shown above that discretionary decisions can be, 
also according to common law standards, reviewed and the answer to 
149 Compare in this respect the statement in Wharerimu, 477: "Standing back and considering the practical 
operation of the legislation, I am satisfied that M. Liddell's construction strikes a fair balance between the 
protection of di advantaged New Zealanders against abuse and the need for a systems that will operate 
without unreasonable interference." 
150 The whole process of determining the members of both the DRC and the SSAA is all but transparent: 
the community representative in the DRC, for example, is appointed by the Minister of Social Services. 
Which standards do apply for this appointment? What kind of qualifications are required ? The three 
people on the panel of the SSAA are appointed by the Governor General, but recommended by the 
Minister of Social Welfare. Again: what kinds of criteria apply? 
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Wharerimu in this respect comes from the court in Chief Constable of the 
North Wales Police v Evans: 152 
judicial review is concerned, not with the decision, but with the decision making 
process. Unless that restriction on the power of the court is observed, the court 
will in my view, under the guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself 
guilty of usurping power. 
It is not about bias towards bureaucracy, it is about protection of the weakest 
and poorest members of society. New Zealand has started as a role model in 
Social Security, but the ideas have somehow been abandoned and got lost in 
a complex legislation and case law system. To come back to these very 
ideas, in the frame of the legal possibilities, that is the task of the judiciary. 
At the end of the day, this could make up for a well intentioned, but flawed 
Act. 
151 Above Wade/Bradley, 643. 
152 Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v Evans [ 1982] l WLR 1155, 1173 (HL). 
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APPENDIX I 
Social Security Act 1964 
Section lOA Review of decisions 
(1) This section applies to-
(a) an applicant or beneficiary affected by a decision made by any person in the 
exercise of any power, function, or discretion conferred on the person by delegation 
under this Act, against which the applicant or beneficiary has a right of appeal under 
section 12J; or 
(b) an applicant, beneficiary, or other person in respect of whom a person makes 
any decision in the exercise of a power under section 19D(l)(a) of the Social Welfare 
(Transitional Provisions) Act 1990 conferred on the decision-making person by 
delegation under that Act, against which the applicant or beneficiary or other person 
has a right of appeal under section 12J. 
(IA) A person to whom this section applies may apply in writing for a review of 
the decision to the appropriate district review committee established under this 
section. 
(lB) The application must be made-
(a) within 3 months after receiving notification of the decision; or 
(b) if the committee considers there is good reason for the delay, within such 
further period as the committee may allow on application made either before or after 
the expiration of that period of 3 months. 
(2) The Minister shall establish at least 1 benefits review committee for every 
office of the Department where decisions or recommendations in relation to the matter 
or matters to which the Act applies are being made or was taken or made 
(3) Every benefits review committee shall consist of-
(a) A person resident in sic: the area of or closely connected with the office of the 
Department where decisions or recommendations in relation to the matter or matters 
to which the Act applies are being made or was taken or made appointed by the 
Minister to represent the interests of the community on the committee: 
(b) Repealed. 
(c) Two officers of the Department appointed by the chief executive-
(i) From time to time; or 
(ii) In respect of the particular review. 
(4) The member of the benefits review committee appointed under subsection 
(3)(a) of this section-
(a) Shall hold office during the Minister's pleasure: 
(b) May be paid out of the Department's Bank Account, from money appropriated 
by Parliament for the purpose, remuneration by way of fees, salary, or Fees and 
Traveling Allowances Act 1951allowances, and traveling allowances and expenses, in 
accordance with the; and that Act shall apply accordingly: 
(c) Shall not be deemed to be employed in the service of the Crown for the 
purposes of the State Sector Act 1988 or the Government Superannuation Fund Act 
1956 by reason only of his or her membership of the benefits review committee 
(5) All secretarial and administrative services required for the purposes of the 
review committee shall be supplied by the Department. 
(6) At any meeting of the review committee the quorum shall be the total 
membership, and the decision of any 2 members of the review committee shall be the 
decision of the committee. 
(7) No officer of the Department shall act as a member of the review committee if 
that officer was involved in the decision being reviewed. 
(8) As soon as practicable after receiving an application for review the review 
committee shall review the decision and may, in accordance with this Act, confirm, 
vary, or revoke the decision. 
(9) On reaching a decision on any review, the review committee shall give written 
notification of its decision to the applicant for review and shall include in the 
notification-
(a) The reasons for the review committee's decision; and 
(b) Advice that the applicant has a right of appeal against the decision to the 
Social Security Appeal Authority. 
Section 12 J Right of Appeal 
(1) Any applicant or beneficiary affected may appeal to the Appeal Authority 
against any decision or determination of the chief executive under-
(a) Any of the provisions of Part I or Part 2; or 
(b) Section 124(1)(d); or 
(c) Part I of the Social Welfare (Transitional Provisions) Act 1990; or 
(ea) Part 1 of the New Zealand Superannuation Act 2001; or 
(d) The Family Benefits (Home Ownership) Act 1964; or 
(e) Any regulations in force under section 132A or section 132B 
that has been confirmed or varied by a benefits review committee under section lOA, 
or that was made by the chief executive other than pursuant to a delegation 
(lA) An applicant or beneficiary or other person may appeal to the Appeal 
Authority against a decision-
(a) that was made in relation to that person by the chief executive under the power 
conferred by section 19D(l)(a) of the Social Welfare (Transitional Provisions) Act 
1990;and 
(b) that has been confirmed or varied by a benefits review committee under 
section lOA or that was made by the chief executive other than pursuant to a 
delegation. 
(2) The Appeal Authority shall not have the authority to hear and determine any 
appeal on medical grounds or on grounds relating to incapacity, or capacity for work 
against any decision or determination of the chief executive in respect of-
(a) An invalid's benefit; or 
(b) A child disability allowance under section 39A of this Act; or 
(c) Repealed. 
(d) A veteran's pension under section 8 of the Social Welfare (Transitional 
Provisions) Act 1990; or 
(e) A sickness benefit. 
(3) Repealed. 
(4) Despite subsection (1), the Appeal Authority does not have the authority to 
hear and determine any appeal against any decision or determination made by the 
chief executive under section 110 (defining job seeker development activities.) 
Section 12 K Procedure on Appeal 
(1) An appeal under section 12J is begun by a written notice of appeal. 
(lA) If the appeal is against a decision or determination of the chief executive 
confirmed or varied by a benefits review committee, the notice of appeal must be 
lodged with the Secretary of the Appeal Authority within-
(a) Three months after the applicant is notified of the confirmation or variation 
under section 10A(9); or 
(b) An additional time allowed by the Appeal Authority, on an application made 
to it before or after the end of that period of 3 months. 
(lB) If the appeal is against a decision or determination of the chief executive 
made other than pursuant to a delegation, the notice of appeal must be lodged with the 
Secretary of the Appeal Authority within-
(a) Three months after the applicant is notified of the decision or determination; 
or 
(b) An additional time allowed by the Appeal Authority, on an application made 
to it before or after the end of that period of 3 months. 
(1 C) The parties to an appeal are-
(a) The applicant or beneficiary affected by the decision or determination; and 
(b) The chief executive. 
(2) The notice of appeal shall state with particularity the grounds of appeal and 
the relief sought. 
(3) Either before or immediately after the lodging of the notice of appeal, a copy 
of it shall be left with or sent to the chief executive. 
(4) As soon as possible after the receipt of the copy of the notice of appeal by the 
chief executive, he or she shall send to the Secretary of the Appeal Authority-
(a) Any application, documents, written submissions, statements, reports, and 
other papers lodged with, received by, or prepared for, the chief executive and relating 
to the decision or determination appealed against; 
(b) A copy of any notes made by or by direction of the chief executive of the 
evidence given at the hearing (if any) before the chief executive; 
(c) Any exhibits in the custody of the chief executive. 
(d) A copy of the decision or determination appealed against; and 
(e) A report setting out the considerations to which regard was had in making the 
decision or determination. 
(5) The Authority may direct that a further report be lodged by the chief 
executive, in addition to the report sent to the Authority under paragraph (e) of 
subsection (4) of this section. 
(6) A copy of every report lodged pursuant to paragraph (e) of subsection (4), or 
subsection (5), of this section shall be given or sent forthwith to every party to the 
appeal , and any such party shall be entitled to be heard and to tender evidence on any 
matter referred to in the report. 
(7) As soon as conveniently may be after the receipt of any appeal, the Appeal 
Authority shall, unless it considers that the appeal can be properly determjned without 
a hearing, fix a time and place for the hearing of the appeal, and shall give not Jess 
than 10 clear days' notice thereof to the appellant and to the chief executive. 
(8) At the hearing of any appeal the chief executive may be represented by 
counsel or by an officer of the Department and any other party may appear and act 
personally or by counsel or any duly authorised representative. 
(9) Proceedings before the Authority shall not be held bad for want of form 
(10) Except as provided by this Act or by any regulations for the time being in 
force under this Act, the procedure of the Authority shall be such as the Authority 
may determjne. 
(11) Where notice of any decision or determjnation in respect of whjch an appeal 
lies to the Authority has been given by post addressed to the appellant at his last 
known or usual address, then, for the purposes of subsections (lA) and (lB), the 
appellant shall be deemed to have been notified of the decision or determination at the 
time when the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of post 
Section 12M Hearing and determination of appeal 
(1) Subject to subsection (7) of section 12K of this Act, every appeal against a 
decision of the chief executive shall be by way of rehearing; but where any question 
of fact is involved in any appeal, the evidence taken before or received by the chief 
executive bearing on the subject shall, subject to any special order, be brought before 
the Authority as follows: 
(a) As to any evidence given orally, by the production of a copy of the notes of 
the chief executive or of such other material as the Authority thinks expedient: 
(b) As to any evidence taken by affidavit and as to any exhibits, by the production 
of the affidavits and such of the exhibits as may have been forwarded to the Authority 
by the chief executive, and by the production by the parties to the appeal of such 
exhibits as are in their custody. 
(2) Notwithstanding anything in subsection (1) of this section, on any appeal 
against a decision or determination of the chief executive, the Authority may rehear 
the whole or any part of the evidence, and shall rehear the evidence of any witness if 
the Authority has reason to believe that any note of the evidence of that witness made 
by the chief executive is or may be incomplete in any material particular. 
(3) The Authority shall have full discretionary power to hear and receive evidence 
or further evidence on questions of fact, either by oral evidence or by affidavit. 
(4) The Authority shall also have regard to any report lodged by the chief 
executive under section 12K of this Act and to any matters referred to therein and to 
any evidence tendered thereon, whether or not such matters would be otherwise 
admissible in evidence. 
(5) In the exercise of its powers under this section the Authority may receive as 
evidence any statement, document, information, or matter which in the opinion of the 
Authority may assist it to deal with the matters before it, whether or not the same 
would be admissible in a Court of Law. 
(6) The Authority shall, within the scope of its jurisdiction, be deemed to be a 
Commission of Inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1908, and subject to 
the provisions of this Act, all the provisions of the Act, except sections 2, 10, 11, and 
12, shall apply accordingly. 
(7) Subject to subsection (2) of section 121 of this Act, in the determination of any 
appeal the Authority may confirm, modify, or reverse the decision or determination 
appealed against. 
(8) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (7) of this section, the Authority 
may refer to the chief executive for further consideration, the whole or any part of the 
matter to which an appeal relates, and where any matter is so referred the Authority 
shall advise the chief executive of its reasons for so doing and shall give such 
directions as it thinks just as to the rehearing or reconsideration or otherwise of the 
whole or any part of the matter that is so referred. 
Section 12P Notice of decision 
On the determination of any appeal, the Secretary shall send to the chief executive and 
to the appellant a memorandum of the Authority's decision and the reasons for the 
decision, and the chief executive shall forthwith take all necessary steps to carry into 
effect the decision of the Authority. 
Section 12 0 Appeals to High Court in questions of law only 
(1) Where any party to any proceedings before the Authority is dissatisfied with 
any determination of the Authority as being erroneous in point of law, he may appeal 
to the High Court by way of case stated for the opinion of the Court on a question of 
law only. 
(2) Repealed 
(3) Within 14 days after the date of the determination the appellant shall lodge a 
notice of appeal with the Secretary of the Authority. The appellant shall forthwith 
deliver or post a copy of the notice to every other party to the proceedings. 
(4) Within 14 days after the lodging of the notice of appeal, or within such further 
time as the Chairman of the Authority may in his discretion allow, the appellant shall 
state in writing and lodge with the Secretary of the Authority a case setting out the 
facts and the grounds of the determination and specifying the question of law on 
which the appeal is made. The appellant shall forthwith deliver or post a copy of the 
case to every other party to the proceedings. 
(5) As soon as practicable after the lodging of the case, the Secretary of the 
Authority shall submit it to the Chairman of the Authority. 
(6) The Chairman shall, as soon as practicable, and after hearing the parties if he 
considers it necessary to do so, settle the case, sign it, send it to the Registrar of the 
High Court at Wellington, and make a copy available to each party. 
(7) The settling and signing of the case by the Chairman shall be deemed to be the 
statement of the case by the Authority. 
(8) If within 14 days after the lodging of the notice of appeal, or within such time 
as may be allowed, the appellant does not lodge a case pursuant to subsection (4) of 
this section, the Chairman of the Authority may certify that the appeal has not been 
prosecuted. 
(9) The Court or a Judge thereof may in its or his discretion, on the application of 
the appellant or intending appellant, extend any time prescribed or allowed under this 
section for the lodging of a notice of appeal or the stating of any case. 
(10) Subject to the provisions of this section, the case shall be dealt with m 
accordance with rules of Court. 
Section 12 R Appeals to Court of Appeal 
The provisions of section 144 of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 shall apply in 
respect of any determination of the High Court under section 12Q of this Act as if the 
determination were made under section 107 of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957. 
Section 81 Review of benefits 
The chief executive may from time to time review any benefit in order to ascertain-
(a) Whether the beneficiary remains entitled to receive it; or 
(b) Whether the beneficiary may not be, or may not have been, entitled to receive 
that benefit or the rate of benefit that is or was payable to the beneficiary-
and for that purpose may require the beneficiary or his or her spouse to provide any 
information or to answer any relevant question orally or in writing, and in the manner 
specified by the [chief executive]. If the beneficiary or his or her spouse fails to 
comply with such a requirement within such reasonable period as the chief executive 
specifies, the chief executive may suspend, terminate, or vary the rate of benefit from 
such date as the chief executive determines. 
(2) If, after reviewing a benefit under subsection (1) of this section, the chief 
executive is satisfied that the beneficiary is no longer or was not entitled to receive the 
benefit or is or was entitled to receive the benefit at a different rate, the chief 
executive may suspend, terminate, or vary the rate of the benefit from such date as the 
chief executive reasonably determines. 
[(3) If, after reviewing a benefit under subsection (1) of this section, the chief 
executive considers the beneficiary is more appropriately entitled to receive some 
other benefit, the chief executive may, in his or her discretion, cancel the benefit the 
beneficiary was receiving and grant that other benefit commencing from the date of 
cancellation. 
Appendix II 
The German Basic Law ("Grundgesetz") 
Article 1 (Protection of human dignity) 
(1) The dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be duty 
of all state authority. 
(2) The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human 
rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world. 
(3) The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive and the 
judiciary as directly enforceable law. 
Article 19 (Restriction of basic rights) 
(1) In so far as a basic right may, under this Basic Law, be restricted by or 
pursuant to a Jaw, such law must apply generally and not solely to an 
individual case. Furthermore, such law must name the basic right, indicating 
the Article concerned. 
(2) In no case may the essential content of a basic right be encroached upon. 
(3) ... 
(4) Should any person' s right be violated by public authority, recourse to the 
court shall be open to him. If jurisdiction is not specified, recourse shall be to 
the ordinary courts ... 
Article 20 (Basic principles of the constitution - Right to resist) 
(1) The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state. 
(2) .. . 
(3) .. . 
(4) .. . 
Law on Administrative Courts 1960 
Section 113 
(1) To the extent an administrative act is unlawful and through it the rights of the 
plaintiff have been infringed, the court quashes the administrative act as well 
as the interim ruling on an objection [in administrative proceedings]. If the 
administrative act has already been executed, then on application the court 
may also pronounce that, and how, the administrative authority has to reverse 
the execution ... If through withdrawal or otherwise the administrative act has 
already ceased to exist, then on application the court through judgment 
pronounces that the administrative act was unlawful, if the plaintiff has a 
legitimate interest in such a declaration. 
(2) .. . 
(3) .. . 
(4) .. . 
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